The Issue of Nuclear Armament and Energy Policy in Japan:

The Relationship with the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facility

Terumitsu Yamazaki, Director, Hakko Hospital

1. Former Prime Minister Nakasone discloses secret investigation into the possibility of nuclear armament in Japan

On June 25, 2004, a memoir authored by Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, was published. In that book, Nakasone revealed that in 1970, when he was the Director General of the Defense Agency, he had the agency perform a secret investigation into the possibilities of nuclear armament in Japan. The conclusion reached was that, although it was thought possible for Japan to become armed with nuclear weapons within five years at a cost of 200 billion yen at 1970 prices, the impossibility of securing testing grounds meant that such a plan was unfeasible.

Although on the one hand, Nakasone stated that he had always been against the development of nuclear weapons by Japan and had not changed his views, he also caused consternation both at home and abroad by writing that if the United States were to ever withdraw its nuclear umbrella protection, Japan would have to consider all defense options, including nuclear.

2. Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles In December 1967, in conjunction with the planned reversion of Okinawa to Japanese rule, the issue of nuclear weapons on US bases in Okinawa along with the port calls of US nuclear-powered submarines, was taken up in the National Diet. It was during those discussions that then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato first advocated that Japan adhere to three non-nuclear principles: to neither possess, manufacture nor allow entry to nuclear weapons.In a November 1971 plenary session, the House of Representatives adopted a resolution against nuclear weapons and calling for a reduction of US bases in Okinawa. The resolution pledged that Japan would uphold the above-mentioned principles of not possessing, manufacturing or permitting entry to nuclear weapons. Again, in 1976, the same year that Japan ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), this intention was reiterated when the Foreign Affairs Committees of both the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors passed a resolution affirming the Three Non-Nuclear Principles as national policy and requiring the government to faithfully implement and observe those principles at all times.Since that time, each successive Japanese government has treated the Three Principles as national policy. (In actuality though, the principle prohibiting access of nuclear weapons to Japanese territory has been violated by the frequent port calls at Yokosuka and Sasebo of US warships capable of mounting nuclear weapons. In addition, equipment capable of launching a nuclear attack is in place at the US bases in Misawa and Okinawa.)For these reasons, when an interview with Liberal Party member Shingo Nishimura, in which he suggested that Japan should consider nuclear armament, was published in an October 1999 issue of the Japanese magazine, Weekly Playboy, Nishimura was forced to resign from his position as Parliamentary Vice Minister of Defense.3. Subsequent statements regarding nuclear armament On May 13, 2002, Shinzo Abe, then Vice Chief Cabinet Secretary, gave a lecture at Waseda University in Tokyo. The Sunday Mainichi weekly magazine then published an article stating that Abe had told his audience that in the event of an emergency the basic rights of citizens would be restricted, and that the possession and use of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) posed no constitutional problems.

On May 31, 2002, shortly before the opening ceremonies of the Soccer World Cup Games, jointly sponsored by Japan and South Korea and hailed as a “festival of peace,” then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, speaking off-record, commented that as the topic of amending the Japanese constitution was now being openly discussed, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were also subject to reconsideration, and that, especially if the international situation worsened, the public might call for nuclear armament. He indicated that, depending on the directions of public opinion, in the future revision of the principles could become a political issue. The many such statements by top government officials suggesting the possibility of nuclear armament in Japan must not be overlooked or ignored. Ichiro Ozawa, then head of the Liberal Party, also made various statements in April 2002, including the remark that if so inclined, Japan could manufacture thousands of nuclear warheads using plutonium from nuclear power plants.

In addition, US Vice President Cheney, in March 2003, and the hawkish columnist Charles Krauthammer, in January 2003, made statements seeming to encourage Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.Aside from the comments by public officials, debate about nuclear armament has also been seen among the Japanese public, as evidenced by comments by Katsumi Sato, Chairman of the National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea. At a February 18, 2003 public meeting in Tokyo on the issue of abduction of foreign nationals by North Korea, Sato declared that Japan should arm with nuclear missiles in order to counter the nuclear development in North Korea.4. Nuclear fuel cycle policy and nuclear armament As of late-December 2002, the amount of plutonium extracted from spent nuclear fuel from power plants that was owned by Japan stood at 5.4 tons stored in Japan, and 33.2 tons stored in France and the United Kingdom. According to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) figures, approximately 5 to 9 kilograms of plutonium are required to manufacture one nuclear warhead. Accordingly, using the plutonium stored within the country alone, Japan would be capable of manufacturing more than 500 warheads.

Japan’s H2 rockets run on liquid fuel and therefore would be difficult to convert to ballistic missiles. However, the M5 rocket launched as an asteroid probe in May 2003 uses solid fuel and has been termed by Kensuke Ebata, a well-known military commentator, as being essentially the same as an ICBM.

Weapons-grade plutonium is being separated from the spent nuclear fuel from the experimental fast breeder reactor Joyo and some experts point out that the reason the government is bent on restarting operations of the fast breeder reactor Monju, is so that the same can be done with its spent fuel.

Another question is what concentration of uranium-235 is required to produce an atomic bomb of the type dropped on Hiroshima? The amount of uranium-235 enriched to nearly 100% necessary to reach a critical state is 15 kg, therefore that is the amount needed to produce an explosion. Even with that enriched to only 20% uranium-235, a critical state can be reached with 250 kg. Consequently, uranium that is at least 20% uranium-235 can be converted to nuclear weapon use. Currently, the uranium enrichment facility that uses centrifugal technology now operating at Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture, is fully capable of producing not only uranium that is 20% uranium-235 but also that which is nearly 100% uranium-235.

What about plutonium atomic bombs of the type dropped on Nagasaki? Even plutonium obtained by the recycling of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants can be used to produce atomic bombs. Most plutonium produced by the operation of nuclear power reactors is plutonium-239. The initial plans for the fuel recycling plant built at Rokkasho have been greatly delayed, however the plant is now expected to start full operations from May 2006. If the operations are allowed to go forward, the amount of plutonium possessed by Japan will only continue to increase. However, operations at Monju, the fast breeder reactor that uses such plutonium, are currently on hold, and the pluthermal project to mix plutonium and uranium to create MOX fuel to be used in existing light-water reactors is also at an impasse.5. Is the ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) project also being pursued with nuclear armament in mind? Currently, Japan and the EU are engaged in a battle to be selected for the ITER project, with sites for the planned construction being located in Rokkasho Village and France, respectively. Nuclear fusion is the nuclear reaction of heavy hydrogen and tritium. If the ITER facility is built at Rokkasho, Japanese will be able to obtain tritium technology. The country will also be allowed to hold 3 kg of tritium for experimental purposes. This represents the amount needed to manufacture roughly 1000 hydrogen bombs, or 100 neutron bombs.

6. What must we do from now?

The calls for nuclear armament arising from both government figures and ordinary citizens run counter to Japan’s responsibility as the only atomic-bombed country to actively work for world peace and the abolishment of nuclear weapons. The Diet, without adequate debate, recently enacted a set of laws concerning Japan’s response to a military attack from abroad. At the G8 Summit in June of this year, Prime Minister Koizumi arbitrarily promised to dispatch Japanese Self-Defense Force troops to Iraq under the authority of the multinational forces, without bringing the issue before the Diet. Also, not only the Liberal Democratic Party but also the Democratic Party of Japan are scheming to revise the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.

Now, more than ever, the peace movement must stand up and make its voice be heard, not just for the cause of peace but in opposition to the related energy policies and nuclear fuel recycling projects.